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Abstract
In a segmented international capital market, the illiquidity of a country fund in the market in
which its shares are traded affects only the share price of the fund (S), while the illiquidity of its
underlying assets in the market in which these are traded affects only the fund net asset value (NAV).
In an integrated market, illiquidity in one market can easily spill over to another and affect both the
fund share price and its underlying asset value. It follows that the closed-end country fund premium,
Pln(S)ln(NAV), is negatively (positively) affected by the fund (underlying asset) illiquidity in
segmented capital markets, but has only an ambiguous association with either fund or underlying
asset illiquidity in an integrated market. Empirical evidence for the 8/1987 to 12/2001 period from
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1. Introduction
A closed-end fund is a ﬁrm that issues shares and uses the proceeds to invest in the
shares of other ﬁrms. A closed-end country fund issues shares in one country such as the
U.S. (the share or host market) and invests the proceeds in the shares of companies in a
speciﬁc foreign country such as Korea (the asset, foreign, or home market). Closed-end
funds typically issue and maintain a ﬁxed number of shares. In general, these shares are
traded at prices (S) different from the net asset value per share (NAV), which is announced
at regular intervals (usually weekly or daily). Deﬁning PlnSlnNAV, the fund is said to
sell at a premium (discount) when P40 (Po0). In what follows, we shall refer only to the
fund premium noting that a discount is a negative fund premium.
Closed-end fund premia are often cited as evidence of the limits to arbitrage and of
investor irrationality. In an inﬂuential paper, Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1990) identify four
empirical regularities associated with the fund premium: (1) closed-end fund shares are
generally issued at a positive premium3; (2) they often trade at a negative premium; (3) the
premium varies widely over time and across funds; and (4) the share price converges to
NAV at liquidation or open-ending.
Theories based on frictions such as agency costs, taxes, market segmentation, and
misvaluation of underlying assets have had some success in explaining the ﬁrst two
empirical regularities, but these theories cannot explain the wide variation of fund premia.
For example, Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal, and Wheatley (1990) ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relation
between premia on country funds and announcements of changes in foreign investment
restrictions, but investment restrictions can explain only large positive premia. Ross (2002)
argues that the fund premium is related to management fees and dividends, but Malkiel
(1977) ﬁnds no correlation between U.S. closed-end fund premia and fund expense ratios.
Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1993) examine the relation between block ownership and
premia, and Wermers, Wu, and Zechner (2004) investigate the dynamics of premia
surrounding the event of management replacement, but neither study explains the wide
variation of fund premia. Similarly, explanations based on the investor sentiment
ARTICLE IN PRESS
3Weiss (1989) and Hanley, Lee, and Seguin (1994) provide empirical evidence of closed-end fund premium at
the issuance, and initial price stabilization behavior provided by the lead underwriters. Cherkes (2003) argues that
this special feature of buyers paying the IPO costs via IPO over-pricing with the underwriters providing prolonged
after-market price support as a supplement to the IPO over-pricing is neither anti-competitive nor predatory.
Cherkes, Sagi, and Stanton (2005) contend that the patterns observed in closed-end fund IPO behavior, and the
observed behavior of the CEF discount, result from a tradeoff between the liquidity beneﬁts of investing in the
CEF and the fees charged by the fund’s managers.
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hypothesis have had some success in accounting for the co-movement of fund premia, but
even these explanations do not explain the wide variation of fund premia.4
Thus, the wide variation in fund premia remains largely unexplained. In this paper, we
provide a simple explanation that is based on the relative liquidity of the fund and its
underlying assets. Liquidity is a multi-dimensional attribute of an asset that includes the
cost of a transaction, the ability to trade promptly, the ease with which large quantities can
be traded, and the impact of trading on prices. Financial assets with similar, or even
identical, payoffs often differ in liquidity, and several studies have shown that illiquid
assets tend to have lower prices and higher returns.
An important feature of closed-end funds is that the shares and the underlying assets are
close but not perfect substitutes, and are typically traded with different levels of liquidity.
To the extent that liquidity affects asset prices, we should expect fund premia to reﬂect the
difference between the liquidity of the fund and that of its underlying assets, and to vary
over time as their relative liquidity varies. The negative relation between illiquidity and
asset prices found in U.S. bond and stock markets suggests that high fund illiquidity is
likely to reduce the share price and thus decrease the fund premium while high underlying
asset illiquidity is likely to reduce the net asset value and thus increase the fund premium.5
Although this is true of domestic as well as country funds, we restrict our analysis to
country funds because the effect of illiquidity on fund premia is clearer and easier to detect
when the shares and the underlying assets are traded in different markets.
We do not claim that variation in liquidity is the only explanation for the wide variation of
closed-end fund premia. Using closed-end fund data for the 8/1987–12/2001 period we show
that the relative illiquidity of the fund and its underlying assets has a statistically signiﬁcant
and economically important relation to fund premia even after controlling for other variables
that have been proposed in previous studies, such as the expense ratio, dividend yield, size,
and age of the fund, as well as a proxy for investor sentiment. So it is unlikely that our
illiquidity measures are proxying for other known determinants of premia or discounts.
The association between premium and illiquidity is affected by the degree of market
segmentation and the ease with which liquidity shocks are transmitted between markets.
We split the 41 country funds in our sample into two groups according to the degree of
segmentation between the share (U.S.) market and the corresponding asset (foreign)
ARTICLE IN PRESS
4The investor sentiment hypothesis is based on the notion that closed-end fund shares are mainly held by
individual investors, many of whom are irrational and driven by sentiment. Theoretical models of this include
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and Palomino (1996), among others. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler
(1991), Hardouvelis, La Porta, and Wizman (1994), Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman (1998), Bodurtha, Kim, and
Lee (1995), and Pontiff (1996, 1997) provide empirical evidence that investor sentiment explains the co-movement
in closed-end fund discounts. However, Elton, Gruber, and Busse (1998) and Gemmill and Thomas (2002) cast
doubt on the investor sentiment explanation of closed-end fund premia or discounts. In addition, Dimson and
Minio-Kozerski (1999) point out that the sentiment hypothesis is inconsistent with the empirical evidence on UK
closed-end funds, which are largely dominated by institutional investors.
5Datar (2001) makes a similar argument. Using closed-end fund data for 18 domestic equity funds and 90 bond
funds in the 1988–1991 period, he shows that within each category of funds the closed-end fund premium increases
as the liquidity of the funds’ shares increases. However, he does not explicitly examine the liquidity of the
underlying assets. Our analysis is more comprehensive because we control for both fund and underlying asset
liquidity and empirically demonstrate that it is relative liquidity that affects fund premia. In a recent paper,
Manzler (2005) also does an analysis similar to ours using data for 20 domestic equity funds in the 1995–2003
period. He shows that the fund premium is higher for funds with a managed distribution plan and it is increasing
in the illiquidity of the fund relative to its portfolio illiquidity. However, he does not control for other factors that
have been theoretically and/or empirically shown to affect closed-end fund discount behavior.
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market. The ﬁrst group consists of 15 funds that invest in open economies whose markets
are likely to be integrated with the U.S. market, and the second group consists of 26 funds
that invest in emerging markets that are mostly segmented from the U.S. market. We ﬁnd
that for the second group of funds, the fund illiquidity is negatively associated with the
premium while the underlying asset illiquidity is positively associated with the fund
premium, which is consistent with our hypothesis that if the asset market is segmented
from the share market, high underlying asset illiquidity increases the fund premium and
high fund illiquidity decreases the fund premium. On the other hand, the association
between illiquidity and the fund premium is more mixed for funds investing in integrated
markets in which investors are able to switch between the fund shares and its underlying
asset portfolio, so that liquidity in one market can easily spill over to the other.
This study’s results have implications that extend beyond closed-end country funds.
They provide further evidence of the negative effect of illiquidity on asset prices, and they
provide an explanation for the effect of location of trade on asset prices. For example,
there are signiﬁcant differences between the prices of different classes of shares used by
‘‘Siamese-twin’’ companies such as Royal Dutch and Shell6 and also between ADRs and
their corresponding asset market shares. Our results suggest that liquidity differences
between the two markets may also explain these price differences. Indeed, Gagnon and
Karolyi (2004) ﬁnd that illiquidity in the U.S. and the foreign market is signiﬁcantly related
to the price difference between ADRs and their asset market counterparts.7
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we motivate the
empirical analysis by linking fund liquidity in the share (U.S.) market and underlying asset
liquidity in the asset (foreign) market to country fund premia. In Section 3, we provide
detailed information on the construction of the illiquidity measures. In Section 4, we
discuss the data on closed-end country fund premium and other control variables and
report summary statistics. In Section 5, we report empirical ﬁndings and their implications.
Section 6 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2. Market segmentation and the effect of liquidity on fund premium
The theoretical analyses of Constantinides (1986) and Vayanos (1998) show that
illiquidity in the form of transactions costs has a large effect on asset turnover but only a
very small effect on asset prices.8 Empirical studies consistently ﬁnd that illiquidity
depresses asset prices and leads to higher asset returns. In the stock market, Amihud (2002)
shows that the aggregate stock returns are higher when the market is less liquid, while
Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), and Brennan,
Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) show that less liquid stocks tend to have higher
returns.9 Finally, Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) ﬁnd that stock returns are related, not only
ARTICLE IN PRESS
6See Bedi, Richards, and Tennant (2003) and the references therein for evidence on the price difference in
different classes of shares used by ‘‘Siamese-twin’’ companies.
7Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) argue that the liquidity of a fund may be different from that of its portfolio. This
suggests that closed-end funds are arguably better vehicles than ADRs to check for the impact of liquidity on fund
premia.
8Other theoretical studies include Kyle (1985), Allen and Gale (1994), Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Glosten
(1989), Huang (2003), and Longstaff (2004a, b), among others.
9Other empirical studies include Datar, Naik, and Radcliffe (1998), Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000),
and Lo and Wang (2000), among others.
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to levels of liquidity, but also to the covariance of returns with measures of market
liquidity. In the bond market, on-the-run Treasury bonds are more liquid and have higher
prices than their off-the-run counterparts even though they have very similar cash ﬂows
and characteristics, and Longstaff (2004a, b) ﬁnds that Treasury bonds have higher prices
and greater liquidity than similar government agency bonds even after controlling for
coupon payment and default risk.
Consider now the effect of liquidity on the closed-end fund premium, which is deﬁned as
the difference between log fund share price S and log fund asset value NAV:
PlnSlnNAV. When the asset market is completely segmented from the share market,
illiquidity in one market is conﬁned to that market alone. Since illiquidity is associated
with lower asset prices, high fund illiquidity implies a lower share price, S, but has no effect
on asset value, NAV, which then leads to a lower fund premium, P. In the opposite case,
high underlying asset illiquidity implies a lower asset value, NAV, but has no effect on the
share price, S, which then leads to a higher fund premium, P.
The effect of illiquidity on P, however, is indeterminate if the share and the asset
markets are integrated so that illiquidity can spill over from one market to another.10 In
reality, some degree of integration exists between markets and to some extent investors can
substitute between investment in the closed-end fund and direct investment in the
underlying asset. When one market suffers from high illiquidity, it is optimal for investors
to divert some of their demand for (or supply of) liquidity to the other market; as a result,
illiquidity in one market gets transmitted to the other market. Thus, both fund and
underlying asset illiquidity can affect the fund price, S, and the fund asset value, NAV,
leading to an ambiguous effect on the fund premium, P. We predict that the degree of
liquidity spillover and its effect on close substitutes traded in different markets depends on
the degree of integration between the two markets. In particular, we expect the clear-cut
negative fund illiquidity effect and positive underlying asset illiquidity effect on P to hold
only for funds investing in segmented markets, while the relation may be positive, negative,
or zero for funds investing in integrated markets.
3. Measures of illiquidity
We follow Amihud (2002) who shows how to construct a Kyle (1985) type measure of
illiquidity using only daily returns and dollar trading volume, which are readily available
for almost every market.11 ILi,c,t, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure for stock i at
month t in market c, is deﬁned as the average ratio of the absolute returns to the dollar
ARTICLE IN PRESS
10For example, Newman and Rierson (2004) ﬁnd strong evidence that the illiquidity in one corporate bond
spills over to other bonds in the same sector.
11Many different measures of illiquidity have been used in empirical studies. For example, Amihud and
Mendelson (1986) use the quoted bid-ask spread on stock returns and Chalmers and Kadlec (1998) use the
amortized effective spread as a measure of liquidity. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) measure illiquidity with
the price response to signed order ﬂow and with the ﬁxed cost of trading based on continuous data on transaction
and quotes, and Pa´stor and Stambaugh (2003) estimate liquidity cost from signed volume related return reversals.
Most of these liquidity measures require TAQ or equivalent data, which are not readily available for most foreign
markets. Hasbrouck (2003) ﬁnds that the Amihud measure is highly correlated with the TAQ-based price impact
measure in the U.S. market. In an examination of the relation between short-run reversals and stock return
illiquidity, Avramov, Chordia, and Goyal (2006) report that they obtain similar results when they replace the
Amihud measure of illiquidity with other measures of illiquidity.
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trading volume:
ILi;c;t ¼
1
Dt
XDt
d¼1
jRi;d j=VOLi;d (1)
where Dt is the number of trading days in month t (approximated as 21 days), Ri,d and
VOLi,d are stock i’s daily return and daily dollar trading volume in day d of month t,
respectively. The measure of illiquidity for each individual stock is then scaled by
multiplying it by 106. Unlike Amihud (2002), who calculates illiquidity annually for stocks
with at least 200 daily observations each year, we use only 21 trading days to calculate
illiquidity for each month so that we can relate it to fund premia at a monthly frequency.
Daily data for prices, returns, and volumes on individual funds for the 8/1987 to 12/2001
period were collected from CRSP, while the corresponding data for the underlying assets
in the foreign markets were collected from Datastream. Foreign market Ri,d and VOLi,d
are measured in U.S. dollars at the daily Datastream-reported foreign exchange rate.
We calculate the illiquidity of the U.S.-traded shares of each fund in the same manner as
for any other stock and denote the illiquidity of fund i at time t as FILi,t. However, the
estimation of the illiquidity of the underlying assets is relatively less straightforward.
Country closed-end funds do not typically report their portfolio holdings at a monthly
frequency so it is not possible for us to calculate the monthly illiquidity of the underlying
assets precisely. Moreover, even if the portfolio composition were known, the price, return,
and volume data for all of the individual holdings are not generally available on
Datastream as its coverage is not very extensive for many foreign countries. Because of
these two data limitations, we estimate CILc,t, the illiquidity of a fund’s underlying assets
at time t in asset market c, by using a market-wide measure of illiquidity. This approach is
used because the underlying asset portfolio of country funds typically has substantial
overlap with the stocks that constitute a representative market index in that country. So
CILc,t is calculated as the equally weighted average of the illiquidity of all qualifying
individual stocks in a representative stock index for that country:
CILc;t ¼
1
Nc;t
XNc;t
i¼1
ILi;c;t, (2)
where Nc,t is the number of stocks in the index of country c in month t. The qualifying
ostocks included in the above calculation satisfy two criteria: (i) they must have trading
volume greater than 1000 shares and returns data available for at least 14 out of the 21
days in the month, and (ii) their estimated illiquidity measure is not at the highest or lowest
5% tails of the distribution among stocks satisfying criterion (i).12
4. Closed-end country fund data
4.1. Fund premium
We focus on U.S.-traded single country closed-end funds and, like most prior studies,
exclude all ‘international’ funds that do not invest primarily in a single country. We also
ARTICLE IN PRESS
12Criterion (ii) here is similar to criterion (iv) in Amihud (2002). Our screening criteria are generally less stringent
than those in Amihud (2002) due to the need to calculate illiquidity for foreign and, especially, emerging markets.
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exclude funds investing primarily in one sector (e.g., commodities). We collect data on the
closing price, net asset value, and fund premium for all U.S.-traded country funds for the
August 1987 to December 2001 period from Dow Jones Interactive for the last trading day
of the month for which such data are reported in The Wall Street Journal. As The Wall
Street Journal reports premium data only for the last trading day of the week, our
premium data typically corresponds to the last Friday of the month. There were only seven
country closed-end funds prior to August 1987 and only three prior to 1986, so the sample
period used in this study is fairly comprehensive. There are altogether 47 single country
funds trading in the U.S., and their underlying assets trade in 29 different countries. We
exclude six funds for which there wasn’t sufﬁcient data available on Datastream to
calculate the asset market illiquidity, so our sample contains the remaining 41 funds whose
underlying assets trade in 24 different asset markets. Table 1 lists the 41 closed-end country
funds in our sample and the dates for which we have the premium data available.
However, for some emerging markets (e.g., Russia), our asset market illiquidity measure is
available for a shorter period than the fund premium data.
To avoid distortions associated with the ﬂotation and winding up of closed-end funds,
we exclude data for the ﬁrst six months after the fund’s IPO13 and for one month preceding
the announcement of either a liquidation, open-ending, or change in investment
objective.14 The announcement date used for any such change is the day on which the
fund’s managers or board of directors propose a change in the structure or in the
investment objective of the fund. If shareholders propose a change, then the announcement
date is the date of approval by shareholders of such a change. This approach is used
because shareholders frequently propose changes but are rarely successful. The
announcement date is determined based on news announcements and/or SEC ﬁlings.
After this adjustment, there are at least 58 monthly observations for all funds. A few funds,
such as the Germany Fund, the First Australia Fund and the Taiwan Fund, have complete
observations for the entire sample period.
The time series variation in fund premium is large, and it differs widely from fund
to fund. The standard deviation of the premium ranges from a low of 5% for the
United Kingdom fund (UKM) to a high of 28% for the Korea Fund (KF), for which the
premium ranges from 41% to over 91%. During this period, the average premium
is negative for 33 funds, and for most of these funds the average premium is less
than 15%. For example, the New Germany (GF) and the First Philippine (FPF)
funds have average premia of approximately 20%. Seven of the eight funds that have
positive average premia invest in emerging markets, most of which are in Asia. Japan
Equity (JEQ) is the only fund with a positive average premium that invests in a
developed market. The Indonesia Fund (IF) has the largest average premium of about
18.2%, followed by the Korea Fund (KF) and the Thai Fund (TTF) which have an
average premium of around 15%. These large fund premia, especially those observed in the
early part of the sample period (before 1990), may be driven by the capital controls
imposed in those countries, as suggested in Bonser-Neal, Brauer, Neal, and Wheatley
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13Weiss (1989) ﬁnds that closed-end funds usually start out at a premium and that most of the price decline in
closed-end funds occurs between 30 and 100 days after the issue. Hanley, Lee and Seguin (1994) ﬁnd substantial
evidence of price stabilization by lead underwriters during the ﬁrst 100 days of issuance. Thus, in the initial trading
period of a fund, the discount may have an obvious deterministic trend.
14Banerjee and Gangopadhyay (1997) report that when a closed-end fund approaches its windup date or turns
open-ended, its price converges to its NAV and thus its discount shrinks in a trended way.
J.S.P. Chan et al. / Journal of Financial Markets 11 (2008) 377–399 383
A
R
TIC
LE
IN
PR
ES
S
Table 1
Information on Closed-end Single Country Funds Traded in the U.S.
This table provides information on all the U.S.-traded single country closed-end funds (CEF) in our sample. Weekly data on each fund’s closing price as of Friday
(or the last trading day of the week), the net asset value (NAV), and the discount, are collected from the Wall Street Journal/Dow Jones Interactive Service for all
dates beginning August 7, 1987. During the period analyzed, several funds announced that they were either open-ending or liquidating or merging with another fund
or converting to a new closed-end fund with a different investment objective. The announcement date for these changes is the day on which the fund’s managers or
board of directors propose a change in the structure or investment objective of the fund. If a shareholder(s) proposes a change, then the announcement date is the date
of approval by shareholders of such a change. The announcement date is determined from news announcement and/or SEC ﬁlings.
No. Fund ticker Fund name IPO date Raw data Change of structure or investment objective
From To Nature of change Announcement date
1 AF Argentina 22/10/1991 25/10/1991 14/12/2001 Open-ending 11/6/2001
2 BZF Brazil 31/3/1988 15/4/1988 28/12/2001
3 BZL Brazilian Equity 3/4/1992 10/4/1992 28/12/2001
4 CH Chile 26/10/1989 3/11/1989 28/12/2001
5 FAK Fidelity Advisor Korea 25/10/1994 4/11/1994 30/6/2000 Open-ending 17/3/2000
6 FPF First Philippine 8/11/1989 1/12/1989 28/12/2001
7 FRF France Growth 10/5/1990 18/5/2990 28/12/2001
8 FRG Emerging Germany Fund 29/3/1990 20/4/1990 23/4/1999 Open-ending 6/11/1998
9 GER Germany 18/7/1996 7/8/1987 28/12/2001
10 GF New Germany 14/1/1990 9/2/1990 28/12/2001
11 GSP Growth Fund Spain 14/2/1990 9/3/1990 11/12/1998 Open-ending 3/8/1998
12 IAF First Australiaa 12/12/1985 7/8/1987 28/12/2001
13 IF Indonesia 1/3/1990 16/3/1990 28/12/2001
14 IFN India 1/2/1994 18/2/1994 28/12/2001
15 IGF India Growth 12/8/1988 26/8/1988 28/12/2001
16 IIF MSDW Indiab 1/2/1994 11/3/1994 28/12/2001
17 ISL First Israel 1/10/1992 30/10/1992 28/12/2001
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18 ITA Italy 26/2/1986 7/8/1987 28/12/2001 Liquidating 21/11/2002
19 JEQ Japan Equity 24/7/1992 14/8/1992 28/12/2001
20 JFI Jardine Fleming India 1/3/1994 11/3/1994 28/12/2001
21 JGF Jakarta Growth 16/4/1990 20/4/1990 8/6/2001 Merging with another CEF 11/10/2000
22 JOF Japan OTC Equity 14/3/1990 30/3/1990 28/12/2001
23 KEF Korea Equity 24/11/1993 3/12/1993 28/12/2001
24 KF Korea 22/8/1984 7/8/1987 28/12/2001
25 KIF Korean Investment 18/2/1992 13/3/1992 23/11/2001 Open-ending 14/9/2001
26 MEF Emerging Mexico 8/10/1990 12/10/1990 1/4/1999 Liquidating 26/10/1998
27 MF Malaysia 8/5/1987 7/8/1987 28/12/2001
28 MXE Mexico Equity and Income 14/8/1990 7/9/1990 28/12/2001
29 MXF Mexico 3/6/1981 7/8/1987 28/12/2001
30 OST Austria 21/9/1989 6/10/1989 28/12/2001
31 PGF Portugal 1/11/1989 29/12/1989 1/6/2001 Open-ending 20/8/1999
32 ROC ROC Taiwan 19/5/1989 19/5/1989 28/12/2001
33 SGF Singapore 24/7/1990 3/8/1990 28/12/2001
34 SNF Spain 21/6/1988 22/7/1988 28/12/2001
35 SWZ Swiss Helvetiac 19/8/1987 28/8/1987 28/12/2001
36 TC Thai Capitald 22/5/1990 8/6/1990 28/12/2001
37 TRF Templeton Russia 1/6/1995 15/9/1995 28/12/2001 Converting to New CEF 12/2/2002
38 TTF Thai 17/2/1988 26/2/1988 28/12/2001
39 TWN Taiwan 23/12/1986 7/8/1987 28/12/2001
40 TYW Taiwan Equity 1/7/1994 29/7/1994 5/5/2000 Liquidating 2/12/1999
41 UKM United Kingdom 6/8/1987 7/8/1987 23/4/1999 Liquidating/Open-ending 15/9/1998
aAlso known as Aberdeen Australia Equity.
bAlso known as Morgan Stanley India.
cAlso known as Helvetia fund.
dThe Thai Capital fund changed its ticker symbol from TC to TF on 16/3/2001.
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(1990).15 On the other hand, three funds (Emerging Germany, New Germany, Growth
Fund Spain), all of which invest in European countries with virtually no capital controls,
traded at discounts throughout the period.
4.2. Control variables
We also collect data on the following fund- and country-speciﬁc variables that have been
found in prior studies to be important determinants of the fund premium (see Table 2 for
summary statistics):
 Expense ratio (ExpRatio): Lipper reports the expense ratio (total annual expense
divided by NAV) of each fund at an annual frequency. We use the latest expense ratio
available at the end of each month as the expense ratio for that month. The average
expense ratio ranges from 1% for the Japan Equity Fund (JEQ) to a high of almost
2.8% for the Thai Capital Fund (TC).
 Size (lnCap): The fund’s market capitalization (in millions of dollars) is obtained from
CRSP. Because this variable is highly skewed, we use its natural log in all of the
empirical tests. The average market capitalization ranges from a low of $35.6 million for
the Jakarta Growth Fund (JGF) to a high of $581.4 million for the Mexico Fund
(MXF). 22 of the 41 funds have an average market capitalization greater than $100
million.
 Age (lnAge): At the end of each month, each fund’s age is calculated as the natural log
of the number of years from its IPO date.
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Table 2
Summary Statistics
This table reports the average value of the fund premium, illiquidity measures, and control variables for the
sample of all funds, and separately for the sample of funds investing in segmented and integrated markets.
Variables All funds Funds Investing in
Segmented Markets Integrated Markets
Number of funds 41 26 15
Fund Premium (%) 6.37 3.70 11.01
Log Average Fund Illiquidity 2.19 2.08 2.43
Log Average Asset Market Illiquidity 9.45 8.79 10.05
U.S. Market Return (% per month) 0.78 0.78 0.78
Foreign Market Average Return (% per month) 1.63 2.37 0.75
Foreign Exchange Appreciation Rate (% per month) 0.89 1.49 0.18
Edison-Warnock Capital Control Measure 0.32 0.50 0.00
Market Capitalization (millions $) 157.82 170.53 135.78
Dividend Yield (% per year) 1.77 1.31 2.57
Expense Ratio (% per year) 1.83 1.98 1.59
Institutional Ownership (%) 15.14 16.61 12.60
Age (years since IPO) 5.91 5.81 6.16
15We do not explicitly consider the effect of capital controls using government policy announcements as event
dates. Instead we use the Edison-Warnock (2003) measure of capital control intensity as a control variable in our
empirical analysis.
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 Dividend yield (Divyld): The dividend yield is calculated as the CRSP reported
dividends (excluding capital gains dividends) paid by the fund in the prior 12-month
period scaled by the end of month NAV. Thirty-eight out of the 41 funds paid some
dividends during this period, and the average dividend yield across all 41 funds is about
1.77% with the highest yield at 7.64% for the Mexico Equity and Income Fund (MXE).
 Institutional ownership (InstOwn): Thomson Financial reports institutional ownership
for closed-end funds at the end of each quarter based on 13(f) ﬁlings by institutions. We
use the latest available ownership data at the end of each month. The time series average
institutional ownership ranges from 4.2% (GER) to about 28.6% (IIF). This suggests
that the vast majority of country fund shares is held by individual investors.
 Edison-Warnock measure of capital controls (EW): Edison and Warnock (2003) construct
measures of the intensity of capital controls across 29 emerging markets based on
restrictions on foreign ownership of equity.16 They provide information on the extent and
evolution of ﬁnancial liberalization with 1 denoting complete capital control and 0
denoting the absence of capital control. Twenty-six of the funds that invest in 13 different
asset markets, all of which are in emerging economies, have EW measures greater than
zero throughout the period and are classiﬁed as funds investing in segmented markets. The
remaining 15 funds that invest in 11 different asset markets, all of which are in developed
economies, have EW measures equal to zero and are classiﬁed as funds investing in
integrated markets. The time series average EW measure for the 13 segmented markets
ranges from a low of 0.11 for Argentina to a high of 0.84 for India. For all countries except
Russia, the measure exhibits a strong negative trend, indicating that capital controls have
been gradually reduced in all emerging asset markets except for Russia.
 Share (U.S.) market factor (USMKT): The concurrent monthly CRSP value weighted
average return for all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks is used to control for the
market risk factor in the share market.
 Asset (foreign) market factor (CMKT): The concurrent monthly total market index
returns in local currency for the 24 asset markets obtained from Datastream are used to
control for the market risk factor in the asset market.
 Foreign exchange appreciation rate (FXCHG): The concurrent monthly change in the
foreign exchange rate between the U.S. and the foreign country is measured as units of
foreign currency per U.S. dollar and obtained from Datastream. This captures any
movement in the fund premia caused by the change in the foreign exchange rates.
 Average fund premium (AVGPrem): Following Bodurtha, Kim, and Lee (1995), in each
month we calculate the arithmetic average premium of all the sample funds. This
variable is often used in the literature as a proxy for small investor sentiment. The
average fund premium exhibits a clear time trend during the period. A regression of
AVGPrem on time yields a signiﬁcantly negative coefﬁcient and a large R2 (33%). Fig. 1
plots the average fund premium from August 1987 to December 2001. The premium
ﬂuctuates substantially: at the start of the sample period, it is almost 13% but then
drops rapidly in 2 months to almost 13% at the time of the stock market crash of
October 1987. In January 1990, the average fund premium reached a high of over 28%.
The large average premium in the early period (when there were few country funds) was
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16We thank Craig Doidge for suggesting this measure to us and Edison and Warnock for making this measure
available on the web page of the Federal Reserve Board—http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/ifdp/2001/708/
default.htm.
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driven mainly by the large premia of the two Asian country funds: the Korea fund and
the Taiwan fund.
Table 2 reports summary statistics of the average fund premium, the natural log of the
fund illiquidity, the natural log of average foreign market illiquidity and the control
variables. The average fund premium is about 6.37%; it is around 3.70% for funds
investing in segmented markets and 11.01% for funds investing in integrated markets.
The average age of the funds is around 6 years. The average EW capital control measure
for the 13 segmented markets is 0.50. The average fund has a market capitalization of
$157.82 million. The average market capitalization is greater for funds investing in
segmented markets ($170.53 million) than for funds investing in integrated markets
($135.78 million). The average dividend yield across all 41 funds is 1.77%, and it is 1.31%
(2.57%) for the 26 (15) funds investing in segmented (integrated) markets. The average
expense ratio across all 41 funds is 1.83%, and it is 1.98% (1.59%) for the 26 (15) funds
investing in segmented (integrated) markets. Institutional investors own 15.14% of the
country funds on average, and around 16.61% (12.60%) of the funds investing in
segmented (integrated) markets. In summary, funds investing in segmented markets
generally have lower dividend yields, higher expense ratios, higher institutional ownership,
and larger premia than those investing in integrated markets.
5. Empirical analysis
In this section, we examine the relation between the level of the closed-end country fund
premium and the illiquidity of the fund and its underlying assets. An interesting example of
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Fig. 1. Time series of average fund premium. This ﬁgure plots the end-of-month average fund premium
(AVGPrem) of closed-end country funds from August 1987 to December 2001.
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the effect of illiquidity is provided by the movement of the fund premium around the Asian
ﬁnancial crisis of 1997–1998 and the Russian ﬁnancial crisis of 1998. During these
episodes, the asset markets in several Asian countries and in Russia experienced liquidity
crises and the average premium of funds that had invested in these countries increased
dramatically, whereas most other funds invested in developed or other emerging markets
were trading at discounts, and were relatively unaffected. Subsequent to the crisis we
observe that the asset markets of the countries affected by the crisis became more liquid
and that the average premium of the corresponding funds declined.17
Fig. 2 plots the natural logarithm of the monthly Amihud country illiquidity, lnCIL, the
natural logarithm of the monthly Amihud fund illiquidity, lnFIL, and the average fund
premium of the closed-end country funds corresponding to countries that were most
severely affected by the Asian Financial Crisis in mid-1997. These funds include the First
Philippine Fund (Philippines), the Indonesia Fund and Jakarta Growth Fund (Indonesia),
the Malaysia Fund (Malaysia), and the Thai Fund and Thai Capital Fund (Thailand). As
the ﬁgure shows, the asset market illiquidity, lnCIL, of these funds increased dramatically
after July 1997, and so did the average fund premium. Although the fund illiquidity,
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Fig. 2. Average fund premium and average liquidity of funds impacted by Asian ﬁnancial crisis. This ﬁgure plots
the natural logarithm of the monthly Amihud country illiquidity, lnCIL, the natural logarithm of the monthly
Amihud fund illiquidity, lnFIL, and the average fund premium of the closed-end country funds corresponding to
countries that were severely affected by the Asian Financial Crisis in mid-1997. These funds include the First
Philippine Fund (Philippines), the Indonesia Fund and Jakarta Growth Fund (Indonesia), the Malaysia Fund
(Malaysia), and the Thai Fund and Thai Capital Fund (Thailand).
17Cohen and Remolona (2001) report that the prices of funds investing in Russia and in countries affected by
the Asian ﬁnancial crisis moved from a discount before the crisis to a premium when the crisis started, and the
premium rose for all the funds during the crisis and then declined gradually after the crisis was over.
J.S.P. Chan et al. / Journal of Financial Markets 11 (2008) 377–399 389
lnFIL, also increased during this period, its increase was not as much as the increase in
the asset market illiquidity. More generally, the ﬁgure shows that in the early portion
of our sample period (end-1987 to 1989), lnCIL and average fund premium declined
whereas lnFIL increased. A similar pattern is evident in the late portion of our
sample period, i.e., in the period after the Asian crisis and up to December 2001. The
results are consistent with our central point that the closed-end country fund premium is
negatively (positively) related to the fund (underlying asset) illiquidity in segmented capital
markets.
Next, we examine the illiquidity–premium relation around the Russian ﬁnancial crisis of
1998. In Fig. 3, we plot the natural logarithm of the monthly Amihud country illiquidity,
lnCIL, the natural logarithm of the monthly Amihud fund illiquidity, lnFIL, and the fund
premium of the Templeton Russia Fund, which is the only closed-end fund that invests
primarily in Russia. As the ﬁgure shows, the fund’s asset market illiquidity, lnCIL,
increased dramatically in 1998, and so did the fund premium. Although the fund
illiquidity, lnFIL, also increased during this period, its increase was not as much as the
increase in the asset market illiquidity. After the crisis, and up to the end of the sample
period, lnCIL and fund premium generally declined whereas lnFIL was mostly unchanged.
Once again, the results are generally consistent with our central point that the closed-end
country fund premium is negatively (positively) affected by the fund (underlying asset)
illiquidity in segmented capital markets.
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Fig. 3. Average fund premium and average liquidity of templeton russia fund. This ﬁgure plots the natural
logarithm of the monthly Amihud country illiquidity, lnCIL, the natural logarithm of the monthly Amihud fund
illiquidity, lnFIL, and the fund premium of the Templeton Russia Fund, which was severely affected by the
Russian Financial Crisis in 1998.
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5.1. Regression results
To estimate the effect of fund illiquidity and asset market illiquidity on country fund
premia, controlling for the effects of the other variables, we estimate the following panel
regression of fund premium:
Pf ;c;t ¼ af þ b1 lnFILf ;t þ b2 lnCILc;t þ b3USMKTt þ b4CMKTc;t þ b5FXCHGc;t
þ b6EWc;t þ b7 lnCapf ;t þ b8Divyldf ;t þ b9ExpRatiof ;t þ b10InstOwnf ;t
þ b11 lnAgef ;t þ b12AVGPremt. (3)
In this case, the residuals are correlated across funds as well as across time. As we have
more time periods (months) than funds, we cluster by time to absorb the time effect and
include dummy variables for each fund to absorb the fund effect (the individual fund
dummies are denoted by af). Petersen (2005) recommends that such an approach be used in
panel regressions to control for correlation across time and across ﬁrms in the presence of
both a time and a ﬁrm effect, and he shows that the heteroscedasticity-consistent clustered
(Rogers) standard error estimates obtained are unbiased. The (fund invariant) average
fund premium, AVGPrem, captures the investor sentiment. The equation is estimated with
and without the control variables.18
Table 3 reports the average values (across all funds) of the time series correlations of the
variables used in the empirical analysis. There is a strong co-movement in the premia of
different funds, as suggested by the correlation of 0.47 between the individual and average
fund premium. On average, the individual fund premium is negatively correlated with
institutional ownership (0.45), age (0.22) and the Amihud fund illiquidity measure
(0.09), positively correlated with the Edison-Warnock asset market capital control
measure (0.25), the expense ratio (0.31), and asset market illiquidity (0.07). The positive
correlation between EW and the average fund premium is consistent with the notion that
restrictions on direct investment in some foreign markets make the corresponding closed-
end country funds attractive to investors. The large negative correlation of 0.65 between
the fund illiquidity and fund size is consistent with the expectation that larger funds are
more liquid. The returns in the foreign and the U.S. markets are positively correlated
(0.40). The EW capital control measure has a strong negative correlation with fund age
(0.69). Fund size and institutional ownership are negatively correlated with expense
ratios. Finally, the large negative correlation between the average fund premium and fund
age implies that, on average, funds get deeper into discounts with the passage of time.
Table 4 shows the regression results for the sample of all funds. As shown in
speciﬁcation (1), when we regress the fund premium on the fund and the asset market
illiquidity (and fund dummies), high fund illiquidity is signiﬁcantly associated with a lower
fund premium and high asset market illiquidity is signiﬁcantly associated with a higher
premium. This result is consistent with the negative illiquidity-asset price relation found by
previous authors for individual markets.
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18To address the concern that the series may be nonstationary, we carry out unit root tests for residuals from
the panel regression. All the panel unit root tests strongly reject the null of unit root, no matter whether it is
assumed to be speciﬁc to an individual series or to be common across all residual series. Levin, Lin, and Chu
(2002) and Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) suggest that panel-based unit root tests have more power than unit root
tests based on an individual time series.
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In speciﬁcation (2), we include all control variables except AVGPrem. Both lnFIL and
lnCIL remain signiﬁcant with the right sign. The other signiﬁcant explanatory variables are
CMKT, FXCHG, EW, Divyld, ExpRatio, and InstOwn. The fund premium is not
signiﬁcantly related to the share market factor but it is positively and signiﬁcantly related
to the asset market factor. It is also positively and signiﬁcantly related to the appreciation
rate of the dollar. Funds investing in markets with stronger capital controls tend to have a
higher premium, which is consistent with limited direct investment increasing the demand
for the country funds. Funds with higher premia are also associated with higher dividend
yields, higher expense ratios, and lower institutional ownership. The signiﬁcantly positive
relation between fund premium and dividend yield is consistent with the implication of the
simple model proposed by Ross (2002). Although the positive relation between fund
premium and the fund’s expense ratio is difﬁcult to reconcile with the simple static
expense-based explanation for fund discounts, it is potentially consistent with the dynamic
model of Berk and Stanton (2006) in which managers whose funds are trading at a
premium or a smaller discount have more bargaining power, which they use to increase
their compensation, and therefore, the expense ratio. The negative relation between fund
premium and institutional ownership is consistent with two possible explanations: either
institutional investors are value investors who tend to buy ‘‘cheap’’ funds at deep discounts
or, as suggested by Barclay, Holderness, and Pontiff (1993), they are simply friends of
entrenched managers and thus enable the existence of deeper discounts.19
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Table 3
Time Series Correlation of Premium, Illiquidity, and Control Variables
This table reports the average of the time series correlation between the fund premium (Premium), the fund
illiquidity (lnFIL), the asset market illiquidity (lnCIL), and control variables, which include U.S. and foreign
market index return (USMKT and CMKT), the foreign exchange appreciation rate (FXCHG), the Edison-
Warnock measure of capital control (EW), size (lnCAP), dividend yield (Divyld), expense ratio (ExpRatio),
institutional ownership (InstOwn), the average fund premium across all funds which represents small investor
sentiment (AVGPrem), and fund age (lnAge). The pairwise correlations reported here are obtained in two steps.
The time series correlation between any two variables is calculated ﬁrst for each fund, and then averaged across
the 41 funds in the second step.
lnFIL lnCIL USMKT CMKT FXCHG EW lnCAP Divyld ExpRatio InstOwn AVGPrem lnAge
Premium 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.25 0.04 0.07 0.31 0.45 0.47 0.22
lnFIL 0.37 0.09 0.11 0.01 0.11 0.65 0.11 0.40 0.02 0.27 0.06
lnCIL 0.05 0.09 0.09 0.32 0.48 0.03 0.25 0.15 0.13 0.26
USMKT 0.40 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.03
CMKT 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.03
FXCHG 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.03
EW 0.01 0.18 0.10 0.20 0.32 0.69
lnCAP 0.06 0.53 0.26 0.10 0.10
Divyld 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.06
ExpRatio 0.36 0.09 0.20
InstOwn 0.23 0.29
AVGPrem 0.44
19A simple regression analysis shows that the change in fund premium is positively and signiﬁcantly related to
lagged institutional ownership, providing support for the ﬁrst hypothesis, that institutional investors are likely to
be value investors.
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In speciﬁcation (3), we also include AVGPrem as a control variable. Consistent with
Bodurtha, Kim, and Lee (1995), the coefﬁcient estimate of 0.835 for AVGPrem is close to
one and highly signiﬁcant. While this suggests a strong co-movement among all country
funds, it is not conclusive that this co-movement necessarily reﬂects small investor
sentiment. When AVGPrem is included in the regression, the coefﬁcient on fund illiquidity
is no longer signiﬁcant although it has the expected negative sign. The coefﬁcient estimates
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Table 4
Panel Data Regression of Fund Premium
This table reports the results of panel regressions of fund premium on the fund and asset market illiquidity as
well as other control variables. The results are shown for the sample of all funds. DUMSEG (DUMINT) is a
dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the country that the fund invests in is segmented (integrated) with the U.S. To
account for across time and across fund correlations of the residual, the panel regressions are run using time
clustering (where each month is a cluster) and using dummy variables for each fund to absorb the fund effect. The
heteroscedasticity consistent clustered (Rogers) standard errors are used to calculate the t-statistics (reported in
parentheses).
Indep. Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
lnFIL 0.017 0.014 0.004
(3.69) (2.88) (0.98)
lnFIL*DUMSEG 0.025 0.017 0.001
(4.73) (3.01) (0.32)
lnFIL*DUMINT 0.001 0.011 0.008
(0.12) (2.11) (2.13)
lnCIL 0.018 0.010 0.011
(4.14) (2.80) (3.76)
lnCIL*DUMSEG 0.025 0.023 0.021
(3.79) (4.11) (4.60)
lnCIL*DUMINT 0.011 0.006 0.000
(5.19) (3.02) (0.21)
USMKT 0.112 0.079 0.099 0.078
(0.98) (1.39) (0.88) (1.44)
CMKT 0.099 0.014 0.100 0.017
(1.96) (0.38) (2.04) (0.48)
FXCHG 0.287 0.263 0.266 0.250
(3.99) (4.26) (3.9) (4.19)
EW 0.190 0.178 0.206 0.186
(12.93) (14.15) (14.19) (14.85)
lnCap 0.029 0.036 0.036 0.042
(2.53) (4.04) (3.11) (4.8)
Divyld 0.387 0.382 0.367 0.369
(7.67) (7.54) (7.39) (7.38)
ExpRatio 0.085 0.078 0.082 0.077
(9.68) (11.29) (9.56) (11.11)
InstOwn 0.684 0.614 0.702 0.620
(21.72) (23.61) (21.35) (22.42)
lnAge 0.005 0.028 0.006 0.030
(0.81) (7.60) (0.99) (8.06)
Avgprem 0.835 0.839
(23.18) (22.06)
Adj. R2 36.88 58.32 64.17 37.16 58.82 64.57
No. of obs. 4603 4241 4241 4603 4241 4241
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and statistical signiﬁcance of most of the other variables remain virtually unchanged but
the asset market factor is no longer signiﬁcant and fund age becomes signiﬁcant.
As we have emphasized previously, we expect the effect of fund and asset market
illiquidity on the fund premium to be different depending on whether or not a fund invests
in a market that is segmented or integrated with the U.S. So, in speciﬁcations (4)–(6), we
allow for different slopes for the two illiquidity variables for segmented and integrated
market funds. We deﬁne DUMSEG (DUMINT) as a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if
the country that the fund invests in is segmented (integrated) with the U.S. Then the
interaction terms lnFILDUMSEG and lnFILDUMINT capture the effect of fund
illiquidity on fund premium for segmented and integrated market funds, respectively.
Similarly, the interaction terms lnCILDUMSEG and lnCILDUMINT capture the
effect of asset market illiquidity on fund premium for segmented and integrated market
funds, respectively. The results of speciﬁcations (4) and (5) indicate that fund premium is
signiﬁcantly negatively related to fund illiquidity and positively related to asset market
illiquidity for country funds that invest in segmented markets. In speciﬁcation (6), when we
include AvgPREM, the positive and signiﬁcant relation between fund premium and asset
market illiquidity continues to hold but the negative relation between fund premium and
fund illiquidity no longer holds. For integrated market funds, there is no consistent pattern
to the results for the illiquidity measures.
Although speciﬁcations (4)–(6) of Table 4 allow us to examine the effect of the illiquidity
measures on fund premium separately for segmented and integrated market funds, these
speciﬁcations do restrict the slope coefﬁcients of the other explanatory variables to be the
same across the two groups of funds. So, in Table 5, we repeat the regression analyses of
Table 4 using separate regressions for funds investing in segmented (see the ﬁrst four
speciﬁcations) and integrated markets (see the last four speciﬁcations).
In general, the results for segmented market funds are fairly similar to those for the full
sample. The coefﬁcient on lnFIL is negative in speciﬁcations (1)–(3) and statistically
signiﬁcant in two of the three cases, and the coefﬁcient on lnCIL is positive and highly
statistically signiﬁcant in all three cases. Overall, the results are consistent with our
hypothesis that the fund premium should be negatively related to fund illiquidity and
positively related to asset market illiquidity for country funds that invest in segmented
markets. In the case of integrated markets, liquidity may spill over from one market to
another so we expect a weak relation between fund premium and measures of illiquidity.
Indeed, as shown in speciﬁcations (5)–(7), the coefﬁcient on lnFIL is negative in two cases
and positive in one and statistically signiﬁcant in only one of the three cases, and the
coefﬁcient on lnCIL is positive in all cases but statistically signiﬁcant in only two of the
three cases.
Finally, we test for the robustness of our results by using an alternative measure of fund
illiquidity instead of the Amihud fund illiquidity measure. Although ﬁner measures of
illiquidity are not generally available for all foreign markets, especially emerging markets,
such measures can be estimated for the U.S. market where the fund’s shares are traded. We
use the average proportional spread (SPREAD) as our measure of fund illiquidity.20 We
estimate SPREAD for the 41 closed-end country funds using the NYSE Trade and Quote
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20Many different estimates based on bid and ask quotes have been used in the literature as proxies for a ﬁrm’s
liquidity (for some examples, see Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam, 2000). One advantage of using the
proportional spread measure is that it is comparable across different funds that are priced at different levels.
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(TAQ) database. Since TAQ data starts from January 1993, a drawback of using SPREAD
is that our sample period is now considerably shorter relative to our earlier analysis in
which we use Amihud fund illiquidity (FIL). Our sample period now begins in January
1993 instead of August 1987. For each fund, on each trading day, we ﬁrst extract the
quoted spread and the associated mid-quote price on a trade-by-trade basis. We then
calculate the daily proportional spread for each fund by dividing the quoted spread by the
mid-quote price. Finally, the daily proportional spread for each fund is averaged into
monthly measures in order to combine with our existing data (which are all monthly
quantities).
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Table 5
Panel Regression of Fund Premium for Segmented and Integrated Market Funds
This table reports the results of panel regressions of fund premium on asset market illiquidity, lnCIL, two
measures of fund illiquidity, lnFIL and lnSPREAD, as well as other control variables. The results are shown
separately for funds investing in segmented markets and for funds investing in integrated markets. To account for
across time and across fund correlations of the residual, the panel regressions are run using time clustering (where
each month is a cluster) and using dummy variables for each fund to absorb the fund effect. The heteroscedasticity
consistent clustered (Rogers) standard errors are used to calculate the t-statistics (reported in parentheses).
Independent variables Segmented market funds Integrated market funds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
lnFIL 0.025 0.022 0.007 0.001 0.004 0.016
(4.73) (3.72) (1.49) (0.12) (0.68) (3.82)
lnSPREAD 0.347 0.032
(4.87) (1.28)
lnCIL 0.025 0.019 0.017 0.025 0.011 0.003 0.007 0.001
(3.79) (3.41) (3.56) (4.78) (5.19) (1.34) (3.46) (0.59)
USMKT 0.144 0.125 0.168 0.034 0.031 0.031
(1.21) (1.65) (1.61) (0.29) (0.43) (0.46)
CMKT 0.096 0.021 0.061 0.110 0.028 0.023
(1.92) (0.51) (1.42) (1.57) (0.63) (0.49)
FXCHG 0.276 0.247 0.226 0.138 0.197 0.178
(3.64) (3.65) (3.37) (1.31) (2.23) (1.62)
EW 0.177 0.158 0.126
(10.13) (9.98) (7.32)
lnCap 0.010 0.009 0.036 0.055 0.064 0.014
(0.64) (0.69) (3.41) (4.32) (5.55) (1.44)
Divyld 0.278 0.243 0.194 0.435 0.475 0.645
(3.66) (3.22) (2.61) (6.77) (7.32) (11.09)
ExpRatio 0.074 0.071 0.077 0.074 0.055 0.098
(8.00) (9.14) (8.76) (5.55) (4.85) (7.34)
InstOwn 0.832 0.725 0.640 0.398 0.407 0.253
(20.17) (19.44) (15.38) (8.94) (10.85) (6.82)
lnAge 0.011 0.018 0.056 0.024 0.013 0.013
(1.36) (2.98) (4.77) (3.06) (2.14) (1.12)
Avgprem 0.833 0.620 0.800 0.802
(18.65) (9.44) (13.73) (12.96)
Adj. R2 36.23 61.19 65.45 68.08 30.94 44.84 56.98 62.16
No. of obs. 2822 2507 2507 2127 1781 1734 1734 1376
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To examine the relationship between Amihud fund illiquidity (FIL) and SPREAD, we
calculate the correlation between each fund’s time series of these two measures. There is
some variance in the individual correlation coefﬁcients but these two series are fairly highly
correlated, and the overwhelming majority of correlation coefﬁcients are in the 0.50 to 0.80
range, with a median correlation of 0.64. We also do the same analysis using the average of
the time series of all funds’ Amihud fund illiquidity and proportional spread. The average
measures of these two series are very highly correlated with a correlation of 0.90. The close
association between these two series can also be observed in Fig. 4, which plots the series of
all funds’ average lnFIL and average lnSPREAD. (For ease of exposition, we plot the
natural logarithm of each series instead of the raw series.) Taken together, these results
support the use of the Amihud measure for fund illiquidity, as it is fairly highly correlated
with SPREAD, a commonly used proxy for illiquidity.
In speciﬁcations (4) and (8) of Table 5 we replace lnFIL with lnSPREAD for the sample
of segmented and integrated market funds, respectively. As expected, the results of
speciﬁcations (4) and (8) are fairly similar to those of speciﬁcations (3) and (7),
respectively. In particular, the results for segmented funds show that the fund premium is
signiﬁcantly negatively related to lnSPREAD. Because our regression uses the natural
logarithm transformation of both the fund premium and the proportional spread, the slope
coefﬁcient of 0.347 on lnSPREAD has a straightforward ‘elasticity’ interpretation. So an
increase in the proportional spread of the fund’s shares by 1% leads to a decrease in the
fund premium by 0.347%, other things constant. As before, the illiquidity–premium
relation is weak for the subsample of integrated funds.
In summary, our ﬁndings show that relative illiquidity plays an important role in
explaining the variation in the fund premium. Similar to the negative association between
illiquidity and bond/stock prices that has been documented in single markets, the results
for funds investing in segmented markets are consistent with the hypotheses that asset
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Fig. 4. Time series of illiquidity measures. This ﬁgure plots the natural logarithm of the average monthly Amihud
fund illiquidity (FIL) and the natural logarithm of the average monthly proportional spread (SPREAD) of all
sample closed-end country funds at the end of each month from August 1987 to December 2001. The SPREAD
data, which are obtained from the TAQ dataset, are available only from January 1993.
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market (fund) illiquidity negatively affects fund NAV (price) and positively (negatively)
affects fund premium. On the other hand, results for funds investing in integrated markets
are consistent with the notion that illiquidity can easily spill over borders and lead to an
ambiguous effect on fund premium.
6. Conclusion
Closed-end country fund shares and underlying assets are close substitutes but are
traded in different markets with different illiquidity. To the extent that illiquidity affects
asset prices, the time varying deviation of fund price from fund NAV may well be driven
by time varying illiquidity of the fund and its underlying assets. Using price and NAV data
for 41 U.S.-traded single country closed-end funds for the August 1987 to December 2001
period, we examine if the variation in fund premium can be explained by the illiquidity of
the fund and its underlying assets (proxied by the aggregate market illiquidity of the asset
market).
Empirical results show that the fund premium has a signiﬁcant and negative relation with
fund illiquidity, and a signiﬁcant and positive relation with the asset market illiquidity for
country funds investing in segmented markets. The results for funds investing in integrated
markets are more mixed. This is consistent with the notion that in an integrated market the
illiquidity in one market can easily spill over to another and affect both the fund share price
and its underlying asset value. The effect of fund and underlying asset illiquidity on fund
premium generally remains signiﬁcant in the presence of control variables that have been
proposed in previous studies to explain closed-end fund premia; besides, we further show
that our results are valid (in some cases, even stronger) when we use an alternative
illiquidity measure (i.e., the proportional spread instead of Amihud fund illiquidity). This
suggests that the relative liquidity of the fund and its underlying assets provides a new and
economically important explanation for the wide variation in fund premium.
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